This big news in the market these days has been the new SEC naked short sale regulations. According to this article, market makers in equities and options have been exempted from the short sale regulations.
In my view there are three main criticisms of the original regulations. The first is resolved by this adjustment. The options market, in particular, was effected by these regulations since it can disrupt hedging operations. Since activity in the options market feeds into the equity markets, if you create regulations that make it less likely someone will make markets in some options, there will be some big effects. The second criticism is the one pointed out by Mish several times that the firms exempted from the shorts has been chosen rather arbitrarily. Finally, is the whole this prevents these companies from going quickly to a fair value and serves as a form of relief for privileged, politically well-connected banks. People lost their life savings on internet companies and rules like this weren't put in place. And I'll leave it at that.
Saturday, July 19, 2008
Thursday, July 17, 2008
Merger Arbitrage
*I generally don't post about specific stocks, but I haven't gotten around to some of the research I meant to do and something I am looking at is increasingly looking worthwhile.
Merger arbitrage is the art of buying companies that are getting acquired and selling companies that are acquiring. When the merger goes through, you collect the spread between them. If the merger doesn't go through, the spread widens and you lose money.
Alpha Natural Resources (ANR) is a coal stock and Cleveland-Cliffs (CLF) is an iron and coal stock. Cleveland-Cliffs announced on July 15th that it will purchase ANR for $22.23 and .95 shares of CLF. On the 16th, ANR opened up around 119 after trading around 95 the past few days and then proceeded to tank back down to a close of around 96 at the close of the 17th. CLF was trading around 110 prior to the announcement and has come down to about 97.25.
Based on current prices, 100 shares of ANR should be worth 22.23*100+97.25*95=$11,462 and only cost $9,580 on the market. Since the value of the ANR is dependent on the value of CLF, you would sell short the CLF in a merger arb situation. This way when you receive the 95 shares of CLF you can deliver them to whomever you borrowed the stock from.
For example, assuming the existing prices are where you buy and short and the merger closes, that means that ANR will be priced such that what you can buy equals 22.23*100+p*95, where p is the price of CLF. If CLF closes out at 100, ANR should be worth 117.23 per share. After your ANR shares are converted to CLF, you can close out your short (worth 95*100 dollars) and keep 2223 (22.23*100). The merger is supposed to complete at the end of the year and depending on how your margin account is handled, it looks like you could put up about 20k for an annualized return of about 20%.
That's not to say that this isn't risky. Merger arbitrage is a very risky business and it admittedly isn't mine. Given how that ANR has fallen fairly significantly since the announcement came out, the market is pricing (excluding shorting costs and TVM) that the stock is only worth three-quarters a share of CLF. I will be waiting for more details, particularly the proxy. Do your homework and certainly don't blindly follow me. I would have bought it on the open of 7/16 and have lost like 20 dollars a share already on ANR and not made it back on CLF. At these prices and this spread, I feel like it would be less risky given the potential gain.
SEC 8-K form
Press Release
edit: Harbinger Capital increased a position from 3/31 of about 8.73% to about 18.36% and announced in a 13D that they would oppose the merger.
Merger arbitrage is the art of buying companies that are getting acquired and selling companies that are acquiring. When the merger goes through, you collect the spread between them. If the merger doesn't go through, the spread widens and you lose money.
Alpha Natural Resources (ANR) is a coal stock and Cleveland-Cliffs (CLF) is an iron and coal stock. Cleveland-Cliffs announced on July 15th that it will purchase ANR for $22.23 and .95 shares of CLF. On the 16th, ANR opened up around 119 after trading around 95 the past few days and then proceeded to tank back down to a close of around 96 at the close of the 17th. CLF was trading around 110 prior to the announcement and has come down to about 97.25.
Based on current prices, 100 shares of ANR should be worth 22.23*100+97.25*95=$11,462 and only cost $9,580 on the market. Since the value of the ANR is dependent on the value of CLF, you would sell short the CLF in a merger arb situation. This way when you receive the 95 shares of CLF you can deliver them to whomever you borrowed the stock from.
For example, assuming the existing prices are where you buy and short and the merger closes, that means that ANR will be priced such that what you can buy equals 22.23*100+p*95, where p is the price of CLF. If CLF closes out at 100, ANR should be worth 117.23 per share. After your ANR shares are converted to CLF, you can close out your short (worth 95*100 dollars) and keep 2223 (22.23*100). The merger is supposed to complete at the end of the year and depending on how your margin account is handled, it looks like you could put up about 20k for an annualized return of about 20%.
That's not to say that this isn't risky. Merger arbitrage is a very risky business and it admittedly isn't mine. Given how that ANR has fallen fairly significantly since the announcement came out, the market is pricing (excluding shorting costs and TVM) that the stock is only worth three-quarters a share of CLF. I will be waiting for more details, particularly the proxy. Do your homework and certainly don't blindly follow me. I would have bought it on the open of 7/16 and have lost like 20 dollars a share already on ANR and not made it back on CLF. At these prices and this spread, I feel like it would be less risky given the potential gain.
SEC 8-K form
Press Release
edit: Harbinger Capital increased a position from 3/31 of about 8.73% to about 18.36% and announced in a 13D that they would oppose the merger.
Thursday, July 10, 2008
Tuesday, July 8, 2008
Increasing 200 day moving averages
I did a quick study of what happens if you look at whether the 200 day moving average is increasing or not. I used the same asset classes and methodology as this which through February of this year showed a return of 11.98% (6.82% std, .875 Sharpe). I looked at three improvements which probably do not have different enough results to tell a priori which is better.
I had originally assumed it would be in less. I wanted a method that would use the same entry and get you out quicker when the market begins to tank, but it appears that the benefit comes from keeping you in the market longer (roughly 70% of the months that are different are from the second method having a buy rather than a sell) and these months, particularly for commodities and stocks, generate strong returns and the handful of months avoided have relatively mixed returns. However, when they are down, they are down pretty significantly (real estate is an anomaly that acts opposite both effects). I was also surprised to find out that on average the TAA method generates on average 50 entry or exit signals per asset class whereas the second method generates about 45.
In conclusion, the TAA model can benefit by being in the market longer and not necessarily trying to avoid more periods.
- 1. If the 200 day moving average is increasing a buy signal is generated, invest in cash otherwise.
- 2. Entry order is only generated when the price is greater than the 200 day MA, only exit if the 200 MA decreases.
- 3. Same entry order, but exit if below 200 day MA and 200 day MA decreases.
I had originally assumed it would be in less. I wanted a method that would use the same entry and get you out quicker when the market begins to tank, but it appears that the benefit comes from keeping you in the market longer (roughly 70% of the months that are different are from the second method having a buy rather than a sell) and these months, particularly for commodities and stocks, generate strong returns and the handful of months avoided have relatively mixed returns. However, when they are down, they are down pretty significantly (real estate is an anomaly that acts opposite both effects). I was also surprised to find out that on average the TAA method generates on average 50 entry or exit signals per asset class whereas the second method generates about 45.
In conclusion, the TAA model can benefit by being in the market longer and not necessarily trying to avoid more periods.
Tuesday, July 1, 2008
Probit and Interest rates
I'm curious how the historical shape of the yield curve can assist in the prediction of returns for holding government bonds. This is a preliminary post that plans to detail some of the basic lines of thought I am pursuing. I am heading to DC for the 4th, so I would like to perform an out-of-sample test to look into how this line of thought actually performs when I get back. I have some skepticism and doubts about this method that can only be confirmed upon more research (more on this later).
I began by collecting total return series for 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, and 30 year government bonds along with interest data that's available for bills, bonds, and corporate debt. Some of the series are active in some time periods and not in others, so I just stuck with 3 month t-bill and 1, 3, 5, and 10 year bonds, along with BAA corporate interest rates.
I first looked at the returns for the different bonds. In general, I am interested in holding for several months, so I took the geometric average three month returns and created holding 10 year (5 years back, five years forward) windows to evaluate each time period. The evaluation was simply which (not decile or quartile, but) quintile or 20% range the return would fall into. So if a time period is ranked a five, it would perform in the top 80% relative to the performance five years prior or forward. This way the select periods of time where bonds dominate don't outweigh the whole dataset and there are still runs where it makes sense to be in bonds. The only reason I don't do the whole series is that I believe doing so would result in too much trading.
The chart above is the average monthly (not 3 month) return for each of the bonds I looked at and each decile. Below that is the same chart except if given a 4 or a 5 above, the left-most column is a 1 and 0 otherwise. Since we expect that bonds with longer maturities should have longer durations it makes sense that the 30 year has the largest spread and the greatest opportunity to profit or lose. I also looked into the correlation of the returns to the 6 bonds. For the most part correlations like 3 year vs. 5 year are very high, but as you get larger differences, there are larger differences. However, what is striking is that the correlation between many bonds, even like the 10 year vs. 2 year, are higher than 80%. That suggests that for the most part if you can build a good model for one of them, the idea should work for all (with the 10 and 30 relative to the 1 year having lowest correlations).
I think it is interesting to look at conditional means (or categories) for different statistics. For example, what are the returns like on average over the next three months when the yield curve inverts (or steepens). The only problem with that is that I have so much data and so many different yield curves to compare. I didn't want to specify one way that would work best (ie. do I only look at when the 10 year inverts relative to the 1 year, or do I look at 2 and 5, do some outperform in different central bank regimes?). To give myself as much flexibility without doing something crazy like a neural network, I decided that it would be best (at least in a preliminary sense) to look into using a probit model to categorize the returns.
I described what probit models are and how to use them to look into the probability of a crisis or recession previously. Essentially, I have the series of 0s and 1s and the goal is to use the independent variables to estimate the probability that an event will occur (in this case, the event is that it is worthwhile to invest in bonds for at least three months). I estimated the model for each bond series using two methods, in the first I focused on the interest rates mentioned above without reference to their past values, in the second I used the interest rates and each of the past 12 lags. The first method is less successful than the second, but it also avoids a lot more curve-fitting problems than the first method. The first method classifies 63% to 72% (from 30 year to 1 year) correctly whereas the second method is up to 73% to 80% (from 30 year to 1 year). For comparison, using the binary decision of greater than the 10 month MA or less, classifies at about 60% for each bond (and including it in the decision-making doesn't help). Note that I consider classifying correctly to mean a probability greater than 50%.
What will be interesting is to look at the false positive rate and the returns in situations when there is a false positive. In other words, I think the value of the probit model is identifying risk/return better than other models. If I can identify situations with good average wins relative to average losses, then I can control my risk better. Using the model incorporating 12 lags (which I am worried about), I calculated the times where there are false positives for the 10 year bond and found a 2% annual return with 3% volatility compared to a 18% return with 9% volatility for the normal (note that this is just what the returns are and ignores the fact that it will be in cash for significant periods of time, just want to get an idea of the conditional means). As expected, the periods when the model says to get out of the market, there are negative annualized returns(-10% with 7% volatility). However, I am a little worried about false negatives, but after looking at how often the model invests (since it invests for three months), it appears that the problem goes away. Obviously the problem with this is that I use the whole series to develop the probit model rather than going with information available to develop the coefficients. I would suspect that these good returns would get slightly reduced by using the actual trading model (which is what I intend to test when I am back from DC). In comparison, the 10 month MA rule, returns 8.5% with 8.5% standard deviation (ignoring interest) though it is invested more often. Incorporating commercial paper yield into the second model would reduce its return (though risk/reward stays high) though also reduce volatility by more in this model than in the 10 month MA rule.
Nevertheless, it appears to be an interesting development, I am worried that the coefficients are a bit difficult to interpret (too black boxy) and that they won't be stable enough to generate significant returns. I also don't doubt there are problems with autocorrelation, but fixing that in probit models can be a pain.
I began by collecting total return series for 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, and 30 year government bonds along with interest data that's available for bills, bonds, and corporate debt. Some of the series are active in some time periods and not in others, so I just stuck with 3 month t-bill and 1, 3, 5, and 10 year bonds, along with BAA corporate interest rates.
I first looked at the returns for the different bonds. In general, I am interested in holding for several months, so I took the geometric average three month returns and created holding 10 year (5 years back, five years forward) windows to evaluate each time period. The evaluation was simply which (not decile or quartile, but) quintile or 20% range the return would fall into. So if a time period is ranked a five, it would perform in the top 80% relative to the performance five years prior or forward. This way the select periods of time where bonds dominate don't outweigh the whole dataset and there are still runs where it makes sense to be in bonds. The only reason I don't do the whole series is that I believe doing so would result in too much trading.
The chart above is the average monthly (not 3 month) return for each of the bonds I looked at and each decile. Below that is the same chart except if given a 4 or a 5 above, the left-most column is a 1 and 0 otherwise. Since we expect that bonds with longer maturities should have longer durations it makes sense that the 30 year has the largest spread and the greatest opportunity to profit or lose. I also looked into the correlation of the returns to the 6 bonds. For the most part correlations like 3 year vs. 5 year are very high, but as you get larger differences, there are larger differences. However, what is striking is that the correlation between many bonds, even like the 10 year vs. 2 year, are higher than 80%. That suggests that for the most part if you can build a good model for one of them, the idea should work for all (with the 10 and 30 relative to the 1 year having lowest correlations).
I think it is interesting to look at conditional means (or categories) for different statistics. For example, what are the returns like on average over the next three months when the yield curve inverts (or steepens). The only problem with that is that I have so much data and so many different yield curves to compare. I didn't want to specify one way that would work best (ie. do I only look at when the 10 year inverts relative to the 1 year, or do I look at 2 and 5, do some outperform in different central bank regimes?). To give myself as much flexibility without doing something crazy like a neural network, I decided that it would be best (at least in a preliminary sense) to look into using a probit model to categorize the returns.
I described what probit models are and how to use them to look into the probability of a crisis or recession previously. Essentially, I have the series of 0s and 1s and the goal is to use the independent variables to estimate the probability that an event will occur (in this case, the event is that it is worthwhile to invest in bonds for at least three months). I estimated the model for each bond series using two methods, in the first I focused on the interest rates mentioned above without reference to their past values, in the second I used the interest rates and each of the past 12 lags. The first method is less successful than the second, but it also avoids a lot more curve-fitting problems than the first method. The first method classifies 63% to 72% (from 30 year to 1 year) correctly whereas the second method is up to 73% to 80% (from 30 year to 1 year). For comparison, using the binary decision of greater than the 10 month MA or less, classifies at about 60% for each bond (and including it in the decision-making doesn't help). Note that I consider classifying correctly to mean a probability greater than 50%.
What will be interesting is to look at the false positive rate and the returns in situations when there is a false positive. In other words, I think the value of the probit model is identifying risk/return better than other models. If I can identify situations with good average wins relative to average losses, then I can control my risk better. Using the model incorporating 12 lags (which I am worried about), I calculated the times where there are false positives for the 10 year bond and found a 2% annual return with 3% volatility compared to a 18% return with 9% volatility for the normal (note that this is just what the returns are and ignores the fact that it will be in cash for significant periods of time, just want to get an idea of the conditional means). As expected, the periods when the model says to get out of the market, there are negative annualized returns(-10% with 7% volatility). However, I am a little worried about false negatives, but after looking at how often the model invests (since it invests for three months), it appears that the problem goes away. Obviously the problem with this is that I use the whole series to develop the probit model rather than going with information available to develop the coefficients. I would suspect that these good returns would get slightly reduced by using the actual trading model (which is what I intend to test when I am back from DC). In comparison, the 10 month MA rule, returns 8.5% with 8.5% standard deviation (ignoring interest) though it is invested more often. Incorporating commercial paper yield into the second model would reduce its return (though risk/reward stays high) though also reduce volatility by more in this model than in the 10 month MA rule.
Nevertheless, it appears to be an interesting development, I am worried that the coefficients are a bit difficult to interpret (too black boxy) and that they won't be stable enough to generate significant returns. I also don't doubt there are problems with autocorrelation, but fixing that in probit models can be a pain.
Monday, June 30, 2008
Bear Stearns in Vanity Fair
The article in Vanity Fair regarding the collapse of Bear Stearns was fascinating. Particularly for an essentially anonymous trader who was able to profit (by shorting other financial stocks as Bear went down) from their collapse. The day that Bear did the final drop (I can't pull up the ticker on any of my normal methods so I can't be sure which day it was) it was up 10 dollars at about 9 o'clock only to get beaten down to flat by 9:30 and then got smoked (pretty sure it dropped at least 25%-50% the next half hour). My only insight is that most traders just see what is happening and react.
Though the entire article is worth a read, I found the following quote particularly enlightening.
The 2005 BAPCA bill was a giveaway to credit card companies, but it seems like this statement doesn't really make sense. First, it depends on if the securities are in margin account or traditional customer accounts. Margin accounts are held in the name of the brokerage, so it makes sense that those would be able to be taken in bankruptcy. Though I'm not an expert, by any means, I would assume that this hasn't changed. Within customer accounts, SIPC protects cash and securities less than numbers only lawyers remember. So based on the statement above, the 2005 BAPCA would allow the immediate seizure by creditors of the customer's cash and securities held at Bear Stearns. To me that just means that if Bear declares bankruptcy, it would be forced to liquidate. It couldn't go into bankruptcy protection and eventually hope to emerge. The equity would be worthless. In other words, senior management would never consider bankruptcy for Bear. I could be totally mistaken, but it appears that if it weren't for the BAPCPA bill, Bear could (big assumption) have tried bankruptcy and not purchase by J.P. Morgan. I'm not an expert enough to know if this is the case, but it would be interesting to look further at the influence of this bill and the collapse of the company.
Though the entire article is worth a read, I found the following quote particularly enlightening.
It was then that Gary Parr and the bankruptcy attorneys patiently explained that bankruptcy was actually not an option, not for a major securities firm. Changes to the bankruptcy code in 2005 would force federal regulators to take over customer accounts. All its securities would be subject to immediate seizure by creditors.
Thursday, June 19, 2008
Natural gas inventories
Natural Gas inventories were surveyed to change by 58 and came in at 57 (prior was 80). Natural Gas proceeded to fall 3% (at writing). For those who aren't traders, generally the natural gas inventories usually don't move the market enough to be worth trading (though they were three and four weeks ago), but I haven't seen such a strong, lasting move on this number when the inventories came in essentially in line. It looks like around 11 there was news (according to Briefing.com) that China would raise some prices of gasoline and crude, but this decision wouldn't affect natural gas. I guess I'm kind of at a loss to describe it.
Generally the trend is your friend, but I can't help put think that this is oversold (the front contract is at 12.72 and UNG is as 60.30 as of this writing). However, bottom picking this kind of strength on the downside can be vicious unless you are looking to hold for a long enough period. Thankfully my only position in UNG was in a play account on updown because I have been wanting to bottom pick this for at least an hour and it just keeps going down. The futures are at 12.65, down 4.3% from the open.
Edit: Looks like I was about ten minutes off the bottom. Also edited for grammar.
Generally the trend is your friend, but I can't help put think that this is oversold (the front contract is at 12.72 and UNG is as 60.30 as of this writing). However, bottom picking this kind of strength on the downside can be vicious unless you are looking to hold for a long enough period. Thankfully my only position in UNG was in a play account on updown because I have been wanting to bottom pick this for at least an hour and it just keeps going down. The futures are at 12.65, down 4.3% from the open.
Edit: Looks like I was about ten minutes off the bottom. Also edited for grammar.
Monday, June 16, 2008
Volatility Smile
The Black-Scholes-Merton model makes the assumption of constant volatility. In practice, we observe something called the volatility smile. Basically, options struck at the money have less volatility if you solve for volatility in BSM than options struck far in or out of the money. This is an interesting phenomenon that finance professors like to write about and hedge funds try to exploit.
I wonder whether equity index options (in particular just b/c I know that the 10 month MA strategy works on them and they have a long history) experience different volatility smiles when above the 10 month MA or below the 10 month MA. If the volatility doesn't change, I would look to a situation where calls are cheap when the market is trending up and puts are cheap when the market is trending downwards. I imagine it would take significant work to look into this. If no one else does (let me know if you do), then I might take a stab at looking into this problem sometime within the next six months. Nevertheless, I think it is an interesting question and could present arbitrage opportunities. Volatility is traditionally higher when equity markets are below 200 day moving averages, but I wonder if it is high enough given historical volatility during these times and the small (mostly negative) returns.
I wonder whether equity index options (in particular just b/c I know that the 10 month MA strategy works on them and they have a long history) experience different volatility smiles when above the 10 month MA or below the 10 month MA. If the volatility doesn't change, I would look to a situation where calls are cheap when the market is trending up and puts are cheap when the market is trending downwards. I imagine it would take significant work to look into this. If no one else does (let me know if you do), then I might take a stab at looking into this problem sometime within the next six months. Nevertheless, I think it is an interesting question and could present arbitrage opportunities. Volatility is traditionally higher when equity markets are below 200 day moving averages, but I wonder if it is high enough given historical volatility during these times and the small (mostly negative) returns.
Thursday, June 12, 2008
Beta and Sectors
I meant to post something about the interest rate environment and tactical asset allocation, but I haven't gotten around to it since the results aren't that spectacular. Still kind of interesting. Anyway, I've been reading Eric Falkenstein lately over at the Falkenblog and his website DefProb.
One point that he makes is that historically buying low Beta stocks has better returns than buying high Beta stocks (though there are periods of significant underperformance such as the internet bubble). I found this result interesting (risk is inversely related to returns, how could that not be interesting?) and so decided to look into a similar strategy using sectors.
I used weekly dividend adjusted data of the 9 Sector Spiders since they began at the end of '98 along with SPY. I calculated Beta vs. SPY using at least a year's worth of data and no more than 5 years worth of data. At the start of every year I ranked the Sectors on the basis of Beta and formed a high Beta and low Beta portfolio with three Sectors each. I also calculated a portfolio investing equally in each Spider to serve as comparison (SPY is market-weighted).
Over this period (from Jan. 2000 to the end of last week), the equal-weight portfolio return 2.4% annually (15.7% std), the high beta portfolio returned -.14% (20.7 std), and the low beta portfolio returned 4.3% (14.3% std).
I then calculated the 40 week (200 day) moving average and considered a signal at the beginning of the month good through the end of the month (since that is how the 10 month TAA works and I wanted it to be somewhat comparable). The results are reported below:
(After accidentally inflating the returns of the high portfolio) The results indicate that the low Beta portfolio outperforms when the market is above the 40 week moving average and slightly outperforms when the market is below the 40 week moving average which confirms the argument that Mr. Falkenstein had made (note that the Sharpe ratio is higher for the high than the low in the below 40 week, I think that the Sharpe ratio is an incorrect method of comparison when returns are below 0). That doesn't change the fact that investing when below the 200 day moving average is very risky.
CFO advisory posted yesterday regarding the sector momentum strategy (which I have covered before on this site) and noted that a significant portion of the return has been due to XLE. The low Beta portfolio included XLE from 2000 to the beginning of 2007; however, from 2007 until recently XLE return 35% annualized compared to 11% from 2000 to 2007. So I would argue that the performance of the low Beta portfolio doesn't suffer from the XLE criticism (note that I really agree with it anyhow).
One point that he makes is that historically buying low Beta stocks has better returns than buying high Beta stocks (though there are periods of significant underperformance such as the internet bubble). I found this result interesting (risk is inversely related to returns, how could that not be interesting?) and so decided to look into a similar strategy using sectors.
I used weekly dividend adjusted data of the 9 Sector Spiders since they began at the end of '98 along with SPY. I calculated Beta vs. SPY using at least a year's worth of data and no more than 5 years worth of data. At the start of every year I ranked the Sectors on the basis of Beta and formed a high Beta and low Beta portfolio with three Sectors each. I also calculated a portfolio investing equally in each Spider to serve as comparison (SPY is market-weighted).
Over this period (from Jan. 2000 to the end of last week), the equal-weight portfolio return 2.4% annually (15.7% std), the high beta portfolio returned -.14% (20.7 std), and the low beta portfolio returned 4.3% (14.3% std).
I then calculated the 40 week (200 day) moving average and considered a signal at the beginning of the month good through the end of the month (since that is how the 10 month TAA works and I wanted it to be somewhat comparable). The results are reported below:
(After accidentally inflating the returns of the high portfolio) The results indicate that the low Beta portfolio outperforms when the market is above the 40 week moving average and slightly outperforms when the market is below the 40 week moving average which confirms the argument that Mr. Falkenstein had made (note that the Sharpe ratio is higher for the high than the low in the below 40 week, I think that the Sharpe ratio is an incorrect method of comparison when returns are below 0). That doesn't change the fact that investing when below the 200 day moving average is very risky.CFO advisory posted yesterday regarding the sector momentum strategy (which I have covered before on this site) and noted that a significant portion of the return has been due to XLE. The low Beta portfolio included XLE from 2000 to the beginning of 2007; however, from 2007 until recently XLE return 35% annualized compared to 11% from 2000 to 2007. So I would argue that the performance of the low Beta portfolio doesn't suffer from the XLE criticism (note that I really agree with it anyhow).
Thursday, June 5, 2008
TAA and avoiding pullbacks
I should probably be studying, but this didn't take me that long to work out and was pretty interesting.
This could be considered another extension of the tactical asset allocation system developed by Mebane Faber that I have blogged about several times. The original strategy is to invest in five asset classes (US bonds, US stocks, Foreign stocks, Commodities, Real Estate) when they are greater than their 200 day moving average and commercial paper otherwise.
I modified the system slightly, maintaining the 200 day moving average requirement, but I added an additional constraint: it could not be the case that it was above the 5 month (4 and 6 have similar results) moving average and the return over the previous month was negative. The point of this was to take into account periods being overbought and then getting back in quickly. The periods above the five month that have negative prior month returns have very poor risk to reward ratios, most significantly for stocks and REITs. So making this simple addition can take a system with an 11.9% historical return with 6.8% standard deviation (.867 Sharpe at 6%) to 11.8% with 5.68% standard deviation (1.026 Sharpe). Though there is not a statistically significant difference in means, there is a significant difference in standard deviations according to an F test.
Not only is this improvement a significant, easy to implement improvement, but it is based on logic. Most trends do not continue up continuously. There tend to be pull backs. This strategy maintains the idea that the trend is your friend and attempts to stay out of a pull back if it happens two months in a row.
Note: the portfolio leveraged 50% has a 14% return with 8.5% standard deviation compared to 13.5% with 9% standard deviation for the original version. The best benefit in reducing standard deviation is in keeping the risk to reward statistics strong when using leverage.
This could be considered another extension of the tactical asset allocation system developed by Mebane Faber that I have blogged about several times. The original strategy is to invest in five asset classes (US bonds, US stocks, Foreign stocks, Commodities, Real Estate) when they are greater than their 200 day moving average and commercial paper otherwise.
I modified the system slightly, maintaining the 200 day moving average requirement, but I added an additional constraint: it could not be the case that it was above the 5 month (4 and 6 have similar results) moving average and the return over the previous month was negative. The point of this was to take into account periods being overbought and then getting back in quickly. The periods above the five month that have negative prior month returns have very poor risk to reward ratios, most significantly for stocks and REITs. So making this simple addition can take a system with an 11.9% historical return with 6.8% standard deviation (.867 Sharpe at 6%) to 11.8% with 5.68% standard deviation (1.026 Sharpe). Though there is not a statistically significant difference in means, there is a significant difference in standard deviations according to an F test.
Not only is this improvement a significant, easy to implement improvement, but it is based on logic. Most trends do not continue up continuously. There tend to be pull backs. This strategy maintains the idea that the trend is your friend and attempts to stay out of a pull back if it happens two months in a row.
Note: the portfolio leveraged 50% has a 14% return with 8.5% standard deviation compared to 13.5% with 9% standard deviation for the original version. The best benefit in reducing standard deviation is in keeping the risk to reward statistics strong when using leverage.
Thursday, May 22, 2008
The Hedge Fund strategy that wasn't?
One of Crossing Wall St's more recent posts refers to an older post regarding the returns to trading when the previous day was a large or small return. They conclude that big days lead to more big days in either direction. In order to avoid any biases, I looked at the average daily return and standard deviation each day and created a strategy to buy if it is more than one standard deviation positive and sell if it is more than one negative. I used a ten year lead up and began the strategy in 1960 without including the returns of dividends (12178 observations). I also looked at portfolios using the same strategies for two standard deviation envelopes. For the 1 up and 1 down portfolios, the return (of just the days invested, ignoring risk-free returns) is 53.9% (15.5% standard deviation, 1728 observations) and 26.06% (20% standard deviation, 1817 observations), respectively. For the 2 up and 2 down portfolios, the returns are 82.4% (18.75 standard deviation, 462 observations) and 18.04% (27.5% standard deviation, 501 observations). Also note that these are annualized figures and on average they might make only 35 trades a year.
All things considered, they look like strong strategies. It makes more sense to combine the long strategies since their returns historically are the strongest. My combined strategy was to be long above the 1 standard deviation and use 100% leverage when above the 2 standard deviation. the returns are 79.05% with 23% stdev over 1728 observations.
Just on the basis of my recent trading, I felt that these returns looked too good to be true (granted they are only investing some 15% of the total observations). I hadn't seen this many big days together in the past 5 months or so. So I decided to look at the rolling 10 year cumulative returns to confirm how it has performed historically and how that would appear relative to today.
The chart above plots just that. Particularly back in the 70s the market trended very well. Furthermore the returns to the strategy were strong from the 80s to the 90s. However, the strategy seems to have lost its edge in recent years. The ten year cumulative return most recently was only 17.7%. I'm sure this is greater than the markets return ex-dividend, but my point is that just because a strategy worked in the past, doesn't mean that it will continue. For example, waiting to start the strategy until 1985 cuts the average return from about 70% to 36% with only 500 fewer observations. What is also interesting is that the sign of the minus 1 and minus 2 standard deviation strategy has flipped since 2000. They are buy signals and not sell signals. 13% return (23% stdev) for the down 1 standard deviation if you buy and 50% return (27.7% stdev) for the 2 standard deviation. The up 2 standard deviation strategy still has worked since 2000 (though with dramatically lower returns, 22% with 21% standard deviation), but the 1 standard deviation strategy has not.
The returns to the strategy appear to be stronger if you use 10 year rolling averages and standard deviations for the entry points, but the success of the strategy follows the same trend. For example, this strategy (the one graphed above) since 2000 returned 8% annualized with 28% standard deviation compared to essentially flat with 27% standard deviation the way originally calculated.
All things considered, they look like strong strategies. It makes more sense to combine the long strategies since their returns historically are the strongest. My combined strategy was to be long above the 1 standard deviation and use 100% leverage when above the 2 standard deviation. the returns are 79.05% with 23% stdev over 1728 observations.
Just on the basis of my recent trading, I felt that these returns looked too good to be true (granted they are only investing some 15% of the total observations). I hadn't seen this many big days together in the past 5 months or so. So I decided to look at the rolling 10 year cumulative returns to confirm how it has performed historically and how that would appear relative to today.
The chart above plots just that. Particularly back in the 70s the market trended very well. Furthermore the returns to the strategy were strong from the 80s to the 90s. However, the strategy seems to have lost its edge in recent years. The ten year cumulative return most recently was only 17.7%. I'm sure this is greater than the markets return ex-dividend, but my point is that just because a strategy worked in the past, doesn't mean that it will continue. For example, waiting to start the strategy until 1985 cuts the average return from about 70% to 36% with only 500 fewer observations. What is also interesting is that the sign of the minus 1 and minus 2 standard deviation strategy has flipped since 2000. They are buy signals and not sell signals. 13% return (23% stdev) for the down 1 standard deviation if you buy and 50% return (27.7% stdev) for the 2 standard deviation. The up 2 standard deviation strategy still has worked since 2000 (though with dramatically lower returns, 22% with 21% standard deviation), but the 1 standard deviation strategy has not.The returns to the strategy appear to be stronger if you use 10 year rolling averages and standard deviations for the entry points, but the success of the strategy follows the same trend. For example, this strategy (the one graphed above) since 2000 returned 8% annualized with 28% standard deviation compared to essentially flat with 27% standard deviation the way originally calculated.
Tuesday, May 20, 2008
Stops
I was directed to IBDIndex through Quantifiable Edges. The more recent posts are also interesting, but this older post on stops is fascinating. Essentially, he tests using an 8% trailing stop and then if you have gained 17% on a trade, he uses a 25% trailing stop. It seems to be pretty successful when trading stocks and would be worth it to check out. In part 2, he gives the results on a robust backtest.
Monday, May 19, 2008
TAA update
I probably will not be posting that often for the next three weeks or so. I have the level 2 C.F.A. coming up and I have got to hit the books.
Anyway, unless there is a correction, May will show a signal to invest in equities according to the TAA model. I was interested in the returns in time periods when the previous signal was to not invest and the following month closed above the 200 day moving average. By comparison, the excess monthly TAA return is 5.16% historically with a 6.94% standard deviation (12% normally) and5.8% excess return (13.76% standard deviation) for the S&P500 timing model. When there are two consecutive months of buy signals, the similar statistics are 6.25% return (13.48% standard deviation). For the S&P500 when there is a sell signal in the month prior and a buy signal in the present month, the average excess return has been .09% with a 12.81% standard deviation. However, if you look at all of the assets, commodities and foreign stocks have very strong returns that keep the overall strategy strong. Excluding the S&P500 dates until there are two buy signals slightly reduces the standard deviation while keeping returns positive, though it doesn't appear to be statistically significant.
For the 24 times since 1974 that if you bought the S&P500 at the beginning of the month when price crossed above the 10 month SMA, you probably wouldn't have any return, but the standard deviation of equities.
Anyway, unless there is a correction, May will show a signal to invest in equities according to the TAA model. I was interested in the returns in time periods when the previous signal was to not invest and the following month closed above the 200 day moving average. By comparison, the excess monthly TAA return is 5.16% historically with a 6.94% standard deviation (12% normally) and5.8% excess return (13.76% standard deviation) for the S&P500 timing model. When there are two consecutive months of buy signals, the similar statistics are 6.25% return (13.48% standard deviation). For the S&P500 when there is a sell signal in the month prior and a buy signal in the present month, the average excess return has been .09% with a 12.81% standard deviation. However, if you look at all of the assets, commodities and foreign stocks have very strong returns that keep the overall strategy strong. Excluding the S&P500 dates until there are two buy signals slightly reduces the standard deviation while keeping returns positive, though it doesn't appear to be statistically significant.
For the 24 times since 1974 that if you bought the S&P500 at the beginning of the month when price crossed above the 10 month SMA, you probably wouldn't have any return, but the standard deviation of equities.
Wednesday, May 14, 2008
Spurious
I generally like Bespoke. They make some good recap posts of what sectors or countries are performing relative to each other. However, I was disappointed with today's post. Their point is that if you graph the S&P500 since October and compare it to June1990 to July1991, we follow a pretty consistent pattern.
I've seen arguments like this made before, "this is just like the conditions leading up to the '87 ('29 or what have you) crash." To the extent that some market participants believe this (as it can be generally be heard in the financial media), there might be some predictive power in that. I'm not sure, I would have to test it. However, my complaint is that simply graphing one time series onto another and positing a special relationship that could indicate future returns is sloppy statistics and bad practices all around. At a bare minimum, you should report the correlation today vs. that time period, how many times there has been similar correlations over time, and the returns in those situations. There's certainly more you can test, but I would suspect that it would make sense to check whether or not the relationship is spurious.
Well, I decided to look into this a little deeper. I use the weekly S&P500 data and compute the correlation of rolling time periods with May of 2007 through the end of the first week of May. Out of 3,011 weeks that correlations were computed, 457 (15.2%) showed correlations with the recent time period greater than 50% and 135 (4.5%) showed correlations with the most recent time period greater than 75%. The most highly correlated periods showed 90% correlation only 3 other times and two happened in 1953 and the other was 1990. However, if you look at the 75% correlation periods, it is clear that every time there has been a downturn, the market tends to look like it is now. They're right that on average, the market has bounced when it was highly correlated with today, 1.7% over the next three months (7% annualized). However, the standard deviation was also 8.5% (17% annualized) which means that it isn't statistically different than zero. On a six month basis, the return increases to 4.87% (9.7% annualized), but the standard deviation increases to 14.7%(20.8% annualized). So if you wanted to take advantage of the historical correlation, you would also be looking to take on a lot of risk.
Another point I wanted to note is that when you have a series like stock returns that have unit roots, you generally need to difference the series or log difference the series to tease out relationships. A unit root basically means that the process is not stationary, it doesn't have a consistent mean and standard deviation. But, if you put the returns in the form of percentage increases, then the returns might have the same mean and standard deviation over long periods of time. The problem is when you compare two series that both have unit roots (as both comparisons are here) and if you regress one on another and find a large R^2 value and positive autocorrelation. If the residuals are also integrated order 1, then you have what is called spurious regression. If the residuals are integrated order 0, then you have cointegration. Cointegration is like the relationship between gold and gold mining stocks (or oil and oil services stocks). Spurious regression would be like the relationship between defense spending in the U.S. and the population of South Africa. Both go up, but there's no fundamental reason. I can't think of any reason why the stock market would necessarily behave exactly the same way twice, but the way to test this would be to set up a Matlab program that iterates through every week of data and looks at the returns of highly correlated months and invests when they're significant. All things considered, it wouldn't be hard to test (this is just one time period).
For example, if you were looking at 6 month correlations on October 5th, 1987 and would hold for 3 months if the correlation were greater than 75%, then you would find an annualized return of about 10.6% with 11.4% standard deviation (pretty consistent even including the awful 1987 data with the whole series). You might choose to invest and lose 20% over the next three months. The risk/reward ratio looked even better on a 85% basis. Interestingly enough, the situation of greater than a 90% correlation with the 6 months leading up to the 1987 crash has never happened and neither has it happened looking at it including October (despite what anyone else will tell you). My point is that a correlation with a previous time period, or a chart pattern similar to what happened before, may or may not be robust, but it should be statistically tested and caveats given before being used as a buy/sell.
I've seen arguments like this made before, "this is just like the conditions leading up to the '87 ('29 or what have you) crash." To the extent that some market participants believe this (as it can be generally be heard in the financial media), there might be some predictive power in that. I'm not sure, I would have to test it. However, my complaint is that simply graphing one time series onto another and positing a special relationship that could indicate future returns is sloppy statistics and bad practices all around. At a bare minimum, you should report the correlation today vs. that time period, how many times there has been similar correlations over time, and the returns in those situations. There's certainly more you can test, but I would suspect that it would make sense to check whether or not the relationship is spurious.
Well, I decided to look into this a little deeper. I use the weekly S&P500 data and compute the correlation of rolling time periods with May of 2007 through the end of the first week of May. Out of 3,011 weeks that correlations were computed, 457 (15.2%) showed correlations with the recent time period greater than 50% and 135 (4.5%) showed correlations with the most recent time period greater than 75%. The most highly correlated periods showed 90% correlation only 3 other times and two happened in 1953 and the other was 1990. However, if you look at the 75% correlation periods, it is clear that every time there has been a downturn, the market tends to look like it is now. They're right that on average, the market has bounced when it was highly correlated with today, 1.7% over the next three months (7% annualized). However, the standard deviation was also 8.5% (17% annualized) which means that it isn't statistically different than zero. On a six month basis, the return increases to 4.87% (9.7% annualized), but the standard deviation increases to 14.7%(20.8% annualized). So if you wanted to take advantage of the historical correlation, you would also be looking to take on a lot of risk.
Another point I wanted to note is that when you have a series like stock returns that have unit roots, you generally need to difference the series or log difference the series to tease out relationships. A unit root basically means that the process is not stationary, it doesn't have a consistent mean and standard deviation. But, if you put the returns in the form of percentage increases, then the returns might have the same mean and standard deviation over long periods of time. The problem is when you compare two series that both have unit roots (as both comparisons are here) and if you regress one on another and find a large R^2 value and positive autocorrelation. If the residuals are also integrated order 1, then you have what is called spurious regression. If the residuals are integrated order 0, then you have cointegration. Cointegration is like the relationship between gold and gold mining stocks (or oil and oil services stocks). Spurious regression would be like the relationship between defense spending in the U.S. and the population of South Africa. Both go up, but there's no fundamental reason. I can't think of any reason why the stock market would necessarily behave exactly the same way twice, but the way to test this would be to set up a Matlab program that iterates through every week of data and looks at the returns of highly correlated months and invests when they're significant. All things considered, it wouldn't be hard to test (this is just one time period).
For example, if you were looking at 6 month correlations on October 5th, 1987 and would hold for 3 months if the correlation were greater than 75%, then you would find an annualized return of about 10.6% with 11.4% standard deviation (pretty consistent even including the awful 1987 data with the whole series). You might choose to invest and lose 20% over the next three months. The risk/reward ratio looked even better on a 85% basis. Interestingly enough, the situation of greater than a 90% correlation with the 6 months leading up to the 1987 crash has never happened and neither has it happened looking at it including October (despite what anyone else will tell you). My point is that a correlation with a previous time period, or a chart pattern similar to what happened before, may or may not be robust, but it should be statistically tested and caveats given before being used as a buy/sell.
Donchian Channels
A Donchian Channel is the formed by the high and low of the past n days. For my purposes, I used weekly data on the S&P500 from 1950 through May. I ignored interest compared the returns (w/o considering dividends) with a strategy investing when the market is above the 40 week (200 day) average. I checked several different ns, but 20 weeks (100 days) seems fairly standard. The results are generally consistent no matter how many weeks are chosen. When a 20 week high is hit, then a buy signal is generated and similarly a sell signal is generated for the 20 week low. I used a 10 week ATR to measure a trailing stop (high-2*ATR or low+2*ATR) as my exit.
When in a position, the SMA strategy generates a 10.6% annualized return with 12.05% standard deviation (1983 weeks).
The short side of the strategy generally underperforms. In other words, equity markets (as represented by the S&P500), do not tend to trend downwards after hitting 20 week lows. The long side of the strategy generates a 7.6% return with a 14.1% standard deviation in 3005 months. I wouldn't be surprised if additional filters would allow the long-side to have strong profits. For example, an additional requirement for a buy signal (not as an exit) with price greater than the 20 week moving average increases return to 8.3% and a 12.3% standard deviation. Combining the two original strategies together generally results in a return not significantly different from 0%. Since this is the basis for the turtle trader strategy, I would consider this pretty important. Unless you're a short-term trader, quant, or hedge fund, I would recommend staying away from shorting equities. Since the turtles mostly traded commodities and currencies, I wouldn't be surprised if this type of strategy works better on the individual components (as this would probably work better on individual stocks rather than equities as an asset class). I still feel that keeping things simple with the 200 day would probably be your best bet.
Since the short strategy generally results in the underperformance, I considered flipping a long when at the 20 week low and the market is greater than the 25 week SMA (no cases when this occurs for the 20 week). This strategy by itself produces a 14.9% return with 14.1% volatility. Unfortunately, over more than 50 years, this happens in only 55 times. I did some other tests in TradeStation with the ADX which also seems to be a successful filter, but the data I was using wasn't nearly as long a time period. I wouldn't be surprised if short-term reversals in equities generate strong returns, but those strategies generally require strong risk management
When in a position, the SMA strategy generates a 10.6% annualized return with 12.05% standard deviation (1983 weeks).
The short side of the strategy generally underperforms. In other words, equity markets (as represented by the S&P500), do not tend to trend downwards after hitting 20 week lows. The long side of the strategy generates a 7.6% return with a 14.1% standard deviation in 3005 months. I wouldn't be surprised if additional filters would allow the long-side to have strong profits. For example, an additional requirement for a buy signal (not as an exit) with price greater than the 20 week moving average increases return to 8.3% and a 12.3% standard deviation. Combining the two original strategies together generally results in a return not significantly different from 0%. Since this is the basis for the turtle trader strategy, I would consider this pretty important. Unless you're a short-term trader, quant, or hedge fund, I would recommend staying away from shorting equities. Since the turtles mostly traded commodities and currencies, I wouldn't be surprised if this type of strategy works better on the individual components (as this would probably work better on individual stocks rather than equities as an asset class). I still feel that keeping things simple with the 200 day would probably be your best bet.
Since the short strategy generally results in the underperformance, I considered flipping a long when at the 20 week low and the market is greater than the 25 week SMA (no cases when this occurs for the 20 week). This strategy by itself produces a 14.9% return with 14.1% volatility. Unfortunately, over more than 50 years, this happens in only 55 times. I did some other tests in TradeStation with the ADX which also seems to be a successful filter, but the data I was using wasn't nearly as long a time period. I wouldn't be surprised if short-term reversals in equities generate strong returns, but those strategies generally require strong risk management
Thursday, May 8, 2008
OverBought/OverSold part 2
Regarding yesterday's post with OverBought and OverSold indicators, I combined that with the TAA model from before (5 asset classes, buy above 200 day, invest in Commercial paper otherwise). I just wanted to add in RSI since that had a tendency to be most effective (can't use lower bollinger band since already out, not enough data for stochastics). I started with the method from yesterday (only invest when RSI is less than 75) which works very well with equities, but this method does not work as well with the other asset classes and it significantly underperforms as a diversified strategy. However, it remains significant for equities, so I will leave it in place for them. EAFE benefits from staying away when there is an RSI less than 50, but the other asset classes are already out of the market enough due to the TAA that it really doesn't improve their situation that much (25 results in no change for any of them) and the change just for commodities won't change the results significantly (statistically or economically). Ignoring the OverBought RSI figure for everything except equities also improves returns (different time periods are slightly improved by reducing them to 98 or 95, but it is not statistically or economically significant).
In other words, what is true for yesterday was likely true just for the S&P500 and not something applicable to a diversified strategy. However, just including it for equities can raise the Sharpe ratio from .88 to 1 over the entire time period and from .94 to .99 since 1990. Not a statistically significant difference for the overall strategy, but since it is statistically significant for the underlying, it might be worth considering an addition. A strategy that avoids situations where the monthly return is greater than the 2 (or 2.5 or 3) stdev Bollinger Band does not improve returns overall.
In other words, what is true for yesterday was likely true just for the S&P500 and not something applicable to a diversified strategy. However, just including it for equities can raise the Sharpe ratio from .88 to 1 over the entire time period and from .94 to .99 since 1990. Not a statistically significant difference for the overall strategy, but since it is statistically significant for the underlying, it might be worth considering an addition. A strategy that avoids situations where the monthly return is greater than the 2 (or 2.5 or 3) stdev Bollinger Band does not improve returns overall.
Wednesday, May 7, 2008
OverBought/OverSold
One of my interests is looking into ways to improve investing returns. I decided to look just at the S&P500 on a monthly basis since 1967. Mebane Faber has noted that the returns to a 10 month simple moving average strategy earns significant returns. In this sample, the returns are statistically significant with a 12.2% return (13.5% standard deviation) compared to a statistically insignificant 5.8% (18.3%) when below. I wanted to test three common OverBought/OverSold indicators on a monthly basis and then check to see if they would be any benefit when combined with the 200 day strategy.
The three indicators I used were Relative Strength Index, Slow Stochastic, and Bollinger Bands. I would imagine that most people who would come to this site has heard of these concepts (which you can google if my explanations aren't good enough), but I'll explain their basic concepts anyway. The Relative Strength Index scales the ratio of the size of recent up moves to down moves. If there are more up moves, then the ratio will tick up which is then scaled from 0 to 100. The %K fast stochastic indicator measures where the most recent close is relative to the range the stock has been trading in. If it is trading near recent highs, then it will be closer to 100 and closer to 0 when trading near lows. Slow Stochastic is a 3 month MA of the fast. Bollinger Bands measure 2 (or n) standard deviations away from the moving average. For all of these, I use ten months as the initial range. I'm only able to do the slow stochastic since 1988 since I couldn't get highs or lows before then.
The biggest problem with these is that compared to the 10 month strategy, these have relatively few occurrences. So instead of being concerned with Sharpe ratios, I'm mostly concerned with statistical significance.
The results are that few of the indicators result in statistically significant returns. Overbought/oversold points on the 2 stdev Bollinger Bands are not significant with almost zero return when greater than the 2 and too few observations when less than the -2 (though that return is about 20% annualized). With breakpoints at 20 and 80, the oversold RSI is not statistically significant, but the Overbought is statistically significant in the positive direction. In other words, when the RSI is greater than 80, the market generally keeps going up. However, at the 90 breakpoint, it is no longer statistically significant. Combining those two signals (greater than 80, less than 90 (or 95) is statistically significant and occurs in about 72 months (14.5% of total). This indicates to me that the RSI does work as a momentum indicator and as an OverBought/OverSold indicator. Finally, the Slow Stochastic with 20 or 80 is significant (though both are positive). There are only five cases where the Slow Stochastic was under 20 (including March) and the average return in the next month has been 5.4% (this April did not disappoint). Increasing the low breakpoint up to 25 still gives significance and increasing the high breakpoint all the way up to 95 still shows significance with positive returns (I expected negative). This would indicate to me that Stochastics are not particularly good as OverBought/OverSold indicators on a monthly basis. However, it is really the most extreme readings that really generate statistically insignificant results. So it might make sense to look at a stochastic of 98, but a stochastic of 85 or 90 is probably more indicative of momentum than anything else.
So how would an investor incorporate these into a strategy? In general, you would want to stay away from situations where you do not generate statistically significant returns and invest when they are. Including the strategy when the slow stochastic is greater 80 or 90 combined with the 200 day MA does not change returns. The 200 day covers the momentum effect already. Avoiding the situations where it is above 98 does not result in a statistically significant difference between the two results. The below 20 or 25 is not statistically significant either. However, both of those two increase the Sharpe ratio of the strategy (note I use since 1988 for this part, but since '67 for the rest).
For the Bollinger Bands, you may as well ignore the OverSold indication since it always comes when you are out anyway due to the 200 day. The OverBought indication increases the Sharp ratio, but its inclusion is not statistically significant compared to the 10month SMA strategy.
What is true for the OverSold in Bollinger Bands, is also true for the RSI. The 200 day already gets you out of the market. Even the best combinations of the OverBought indicator (noted before at 80 and 90) do not improve significantly on the 200 day MA. However, if you reduce the break down to 75 and do not invest when the momentum is greater than that, then you will significantly increase returns at the 10% level. I just kind of pulled that number out of the air so I was surprised it works and am more afraid that it was a bit of curve fitting. The only problem is that if you are an investor looking for total returns, you will reduce the months of investing by almost 50%. Even still, though, if you include the risk-free return, then the historic returns for this strategy are at 11.5% (10.7% SMA) with a standard deviation of 8.1%(11.6% SMA). That ratio of return to risk is consistent over multiple time periods. The ratio is also fairly consistent going down through 70 (and below, though the returns suffer since you are in that many fewer days). The good thing about the RSI is that it is easily incorporated into other strategies since it only uses closing prices.
One additional improvement (that could be some curve fitting action) would be to make three requirements for a position, the first is SMA or below 25 on the stochastic, the second is RSI less than 75, and the third that the stochastic is not greater than 95. This return is significantly greater than the original SMA almost at the 2.5% level. After incorporating the risk-free return, the Sharpe ratio is .71 vs. .63 for only the RSI requirement, and finally .43 for the SMA. I plan on backtesting the TAA strategy with the RSI requirement, but I cannot backtest the complete method since I don't have high/low information for total return indices on bonds and REITs. ETFs have the information, but the time frame is smaller which makes comparisons difficult (though implementation is still possible).
In conclusion, OverBought and OverSold indicators can have some value in pointing out time periods to avoid (or get in), but they seem to have the most value when used in conjunction with each other. There are many dangers with curve fitting when using this kind of analysis, so the general rule is to keep it simple stupid and test a strategy that works on one set of data on other sets and look for some kind of consistency in the returns.
The three indicators I used were Relative Strength Index, Slow Stochastic, and Bollinger Bands. I would imagine that most people who would come to this site has heard of these concepts (which you can google if my explanations aren't good enough), but I'll explain their basic concepts anyway. The Relative Strength Index scales the ratio of the size of recent up moves to down moves. If there are more up moves, then the ratio will tick up which is then scaled from 0 to 100. The %K fast stochastic indicator measures where the most recent close is relative to the range the stock has been trading in. If it is trading near recent highs, then it will be closer to 100 and closer to 0 when trading near lows. Slow Stochastic is a 3 month MA of the fast. Bollinger Bands measure 2 (or n) standard deviations away from the moving average. For all of these, I use ten months as the initial range. I'm only able to do the slow stochastic since 1988 since I couldn't get highs or lows before then.
The biggest problem with these is that compared to the 10 month strategy, these have relatively few occurrences. So instead of being concerned with Sharpe ratios, I'm mostly concerned with statistical significance.
The results are that few of the indicators result in statistically significant returns. Overbought/oversold points on the 2 stdev Bollinger Bands are not significant with almost zero return when greater than the 2 and too few observations when less than the -2 (though that return is about 20% annualized). With breakpoints at 20 and 80, the oversold RSI is not statistically significant, but the Overbought is statistically significant in the positive direction. In other words, when the RSI is greater than 80, the market generally keeps going up. However, at the 90 breakpoint, it is no longer statistically significant. Combining those two signals (greater than 80, less than 90 (or 95) is statistically significant and occurs in about 72 months (14.5% of total). This indicates to me that the RSI does work as a momentum indicator and as an OverBought/OverSold indicator. Finally, the Slow Stochastic with 20 or 80 is significant (though both are positive). There are only five cases where the Slow Stochastic was under 20 (including March) and the average return in the next month has been 5.4% (this April did not disappoint). Increasing the low breakpoint up to 25 still gives significance and increasing the high breakpoint all the way up to 95 still shows significance with positive returns (I expected negative). This would indicate to me that Stochastics are not particularly good as OverBought/OverSold indicators on a monthly basis. However, it is really the most extreme readings that really generate statistically insignificant results. So it might make sense to look at a stochastic of 98, but a stochastic of 85 or 90 is probably more indicative of momentum than anything else.
So how would an investor incorporate these into a strategy? In general, you would want to stay away from situations where you do not generate statistically significant returns and invest when they are. Including the strategy when the slow stochastic is greater 80 or 90 combined with the 200 day MA does not change returns. The 200 day covers the momentum effect already. Avoiding the situations where it is above 98 does not result in a statistically significant difference between the two results. The below 20 or 25 is not statistically significant either. However, both of those two increase the Sharpe ratio of the strategy (note I use since 1988 for this part, but since '67 for the rest).
For the Bollinger Bands, you may as well ignore the OverSold indication since it always comes when you are out anyway due to the 200 day. The OverBought indication increases the Sharp ratio, but its inclusion is not statistically significant compared to the 10month SMA strategy.
What is true for the OverSold in Bollinger Bands, is also true for the RSI. The 200 day already gets you out of the market. Even the best combinations of the OverBought indicator (noted before at 80 and 90) do not improve significantly on the 200 day MA. However, if you reduce the break down to 75 and do not invest when the momentum is greater than that, then you will significantly increase returns at the 10% level. I just kind of pulled that number out of the air so I was surprised it works and am more afraid that it was a bit of curve fitting. The only problem is that if you are an investor looking for total returns, you will reduce the months of investing by almost 50%. Even still, though, if you include the risk-free return, then the historic returns for this strategy are at 11.5% (10.7% SMA) with a standard deviation of 8.1%(11.6% SMA). That ratio of return to risk is consistent over multiple time periods. The ratio is also fairly consistent going down through 70 (and below, though the returns suffer since you are in that many fewer days). The good thing about the RSI is that it is easily incorporated into other strategies since it only uses closing prices.
One additional improvement (that could be some curve fitting action) would be to make three requirements for a position, the first is SMA or below 25 on the stochastic, the second is RSI less than 75, and the third that the stochastic is not greater than 95. This return is significantly greater than the original SMA almost at the 2.5% level. After incorporating the risk-free return, the Sharpe ratio is .71 vs. .63 for only the RSI requirement, and finally .43 for the SMA. I plan on backtesting the TAA strategy with the RSI requirement, but I cannot backtest the complete method since I don't have high/low information for total return indices on bonds and REITs. ETFs have the information, but the time frame is smaller which makes comparisons difficult (though implementation is still possible).
In conclusion, OverBought and OverSold indicators can have some value in pointing out time periods to avoid (or get in), but they seem to have the most value when used in conjunction with each other. There are many dangers with curve fitting when using this kind of analysis, so the general rule is to keep it simple stupid and test a strategy that works on one set of data on other sets and look for some kind of consistency in the returns.
Monday, May 5, 2008
BRK
Berkshire Hathaway held their annual meeting over the weekend. There has been some news about how lower returns on the insurance business and their derivatives positions (specifically equity index puts) hurt their bottom line. I love to take the time to gloat that I called it (it being losing money on the puts in the short-term).
However, I don't think the coverage of the loss has been that great. He only has European puts which require payment at expiration, so the loss is unrealized. He has paid out no money and won't have to pay out any money for many, many years (if at all, which is what I argued). I'm by no means an expert in the way that derivative contracts are accounted for (see FAS 133 if you want to figure it out), but traditional equities or fixed income can be classified as held-to-maturity, available-for-sale, or trading securities. If a derivative contract were classified under the fixed income or equities held-to-maturity method, then the historical cost would be recorded on the balance sheet and any realized gains or losses would be recorded as they occur. Short of bankruptcy, I can't imagine a situation where Buffett would get out of these positions. I guess I don't understand why he isn't allowed to use this method of accounting since it most fairly represents the value of the position. FAS133 seems to require any derivative that is not part of a hedging operation to have the gains or losses recorded each quarter. That seems inaccurate and misleading. If I were performing equity analysis on Berkshire Hathaway (or any company with large derivative positions that they could never possibly lose money on if they held to maturity and are well-capitalized), then I would restate that part of the balance sheet as if they were held-to-maturity.
Also, I should note that the numbers on the balance sheet that are reported as liabilities and occasionally mentioned in the press for his derivative positions, might also include new positions. A quarter of the increase in liabilities (383 million of 1.6 billion) on equity index puts is due to new positions, and a third (229 million of 667 million) of the CDS losses. I don't know much about the underlying content of the CDS positions, but losses on these positions could be outweighed by the (unrealized) profits on the index puts if the market improves. A little strange that he would lose money on both (market still collapsing in March, but credit conditions improving). Overall, he lost 1.2 billion on the equity index puts that he will never have to pay out. That would make Net Earnings per common of about 1382 instead of 1682 (decline of 18% instead of 64%). Considering other financial firms have performed significantly worse, I would say that isn't that bad. And Berkshire Hathaway will be able to show much greater (unrealized) profit if the market improves, even though we know that they really just gained back money written off.
However, I don't think the coverage of the loss has been that great. He only has European puts which require payment at expiration, so the loss is unrealized. He has paid out no money and won't have to pay out any money for many, many years (if at all, which is what I argued). I'm by no means an expert in the way that derivative contracts are accounted for (see FAS 133 if you want to figure it out), but traditional equities or fixed income can be classified as held-to-maturity, available-for-sale, or trading securities. If a derivative contract were classified under the fixed income or equities held-to-maturity method, then the historical cost would be recorded on the balance sheet and any realized gains or losses would be recorded as they occur. Short of bankruptcy, I can't imagine a situation where Buffett would get out of these positions. I guess I don't understand why he isn't allowed to use this method of accounting since it most fairly represents the value of the position. FAS133 seems to require any derivative that is not part of a hedging operation to have the gains or losses recorded each quarter. That seems inaccurate and misleading. If I were performing equity analysis on Berkshire Hathaway (or any company with large derivative positions that they could never possibly lose money on if they held to maturity and are well-capitalized), then I would restate that part of the balance sheet as if they were held-to-maturity.
Also, I should note that the numbers on the balance sheet that are reported as liabilities and occasionally mentioned in the press for his derivative positions, might also include new positions. A quarter of the increase in liabilities (383 million of 1.6 billion) on equity index puts is due to new positions, and a third (229 million of 667 million) of the CDS losses. I don't know much about the underlying content of the CDS positions, but losses on these positions could be outweighed by the (unrealized) profits on the index puts if the market improves. A little strange that he would lose money on both (market still collapsing in March, but credit conditions improving). Overall, he lost 1.2 billion on the equity index puts that he will never have to pay out. That would make Net Earnings per common of about 1382 instead of 1682 (decline of 18% instead of 64%). Considering other financial firms have performed significantly worse, I would say that isn't that bad. And Berkshire Hathaway will be able to show much greater (unrealized) profit if the market improves, even though we know that they really just gained back money written off.
Friday, May 2, 2008
Wish you were here
Here's for wishing that the BLS had an easier method for pulling data on the birth-death model from their website.
Anyway, this might just be pulling stuff out from nowhere since I didn't extend the series for long enough, but I did some manipulation of the Establishment survey data that came out today to get an idea of what the results would have been if the birth-death model hadn't been adjusting the data. Here's my big problem, when we compare results from now to the last recession, you're not comparing the same thing since the Birth-Death model has been adding jobs. There have been different methodologies over the past 8 years or so, but as they have changed, they have been adding more and more jobs through the BD model. Ideally if you wanted to compare all of the data, you would completely remove the influence of the BD model from non-farm payrolls.
For example, several financial reporters have noted that the decline in this month was not nearly as large as from March to April 2001 when the economy shed 281,000 jobs. The birth death model added 52k in March and 75k in April of 2001 which would mean that the net effect would be losing 304,000 jobs (note that this comparison may not be perfect since the Birth Death figures could be non-seasonally adjusted and I'm looking at seasonally adjusted payroll data). In comparison, the April figure for this year was -20,000 before taking into account the Birth Death model, but -145,000 after. In other words, we lost about half as much as many jobs as the beginning of the last recession. The numbers for Feb-Apr have all been negative and for the year we have lost 457,000 jobs compared to adding 1,090,000 all of last year. In comparison, the first four months of 2001 didn't shed as many BD adjusted jobs. (though most of the job losses came in the second half of that year).
Again, I'm not sure if this analysis is the best, but my point is that you can't compare historical recessions to this one using job data that has been manipulated. So when you hear financial reporters say that the job report isn't that bad, know that they really don't know what they're talking about.
Addendum: if you take everything in non-seasonally adjusted figures (Dec and Jan are vastly different), then March showed 573 after B/D adjustment and April showed 578 afterwards. This is compared to 571 and 382 in March and April of 2001, respectively. Again, you really need to then re-seasonalize the data (by whatever method the BLS does it) to really compare it to what generally gets reported in the financial press.
Anyway, this might just be pulling stuff out from nowhere since I didn't extend the series for long enough, but I did some manipulation of the Establishment survey data that came out today to get an idea of what the results would have been if the birth-death model hadn't been adjusting the data. Here's my big problem, when we compare results from now to the last recession, you're not comparing the same thing since the Birth-Death model has been adding jobs. There have been different methodologies over the past 8 years or so, but as they have changed, they have been adding more and more jobs through the BD model. Ideally if you wanted to compare all of the data, you would completely remove the influence of the BD model from non-farm payrolls.
For example, several financial reporters have noted that the decline in this month was not nearly as large as from March to April 2001 when the economy shed 281,000 jobs. The birth death model added 52k in March and 75k in April of 2001 which would mean that the net effect would be losing 304,000 jobs (note that this comparison may not be perfect since the Birth Death figures could be non-seasonally adjusted and I'm looking at seasonally adjusted payroll data). In comparison, the April figure for this year was -20,000 before taking into account the Birth Death model, but -145,000 after. In other words, we lost about half as much as many jobs as the beginning of the last recession. The numbers for Feb-Apr have all been negative and for the year we have lost 457,000 jobs compared to adding 1,090,000 all of last year. In comparison, the first four months of 2001 didn't shed as many BD adjusted jobs. (though most of the job losses came in the second half of that year).
Again, I'm not sure if this analysis is the best, but my point is that you can't compare historical recessions to this one using job data that has been manipulated. So when you hear financial reporters say that the job report isn't that bad, know that they really don't know what they're talking about.
Addendum: if you take everything in non-seasonally adjusted figures (Dec and Jan are vastly different), then March showed 573 after B/D adjustment and April showed 578 afterwards. This is compared to 571 and 382 in March and April of 2001, respectively. Again, you really need to then re-seasonalize the data (by whatever method the BLS does it) to really compare it to what generally gets reported in the financial press.
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
Here's for not understanding GDP numbers
In addition to the plethora of economic information coming out today, advance GDP numbers came out for quarter 1 early this morning. I'm not surprised that the current account deficit narrowed, that is to be expected with a weaker dollar. Looking at the percentage change table, it is clear that inventories were strong and services were strong. The increase in inventories was responsible for a 20 billion dollar increase, but the increase in services was responsible for a 40 billion increase. The Q4 inventory data was pretty awful, so I'm not surprised there was a bit of mean-reversion. However, I'm more surprised at services being as strong as they are.
If you go into table 2.3.1 (or 2.3.6), you will see why services are strong. Basically, in spite of a housing recession, spending on housing (services, not to be confused with residential investment) goes up. I'm not surprised that housing operation is going up (electricity is increasing at a 15% rate), but I'm a little baffled why in the middle of dramatic decreases in home prices and sales that spending on housing would be increasing. Medical care and household operation (electricity mostly) make up a big percentage of the increase in services (and therefore services), roughly half. And another large increase is due to other. The big question I have is, why isn't spending on housing services decreasing in the GDP numbers rather than consistently increasing? The durable goods section showed only a small decrease, but the average increase since 2006 in the housing services number has been .6% and increased by .55% this time. Effectively in line. Granted that the ISM non-manufacturing index was below 50 the entire quarter, it makes even less sense why services would be increasing.
Ultimately, if you use better inflation numbers or per-capita figures, this would probably be the second quarter of a declining GDP. Not the best definition of whether we are in a recession, but it's what the financial press usually talks up.
If you go into table 2.3.1 (or 2.3.6), you will see why services are strong. Basically, in spite of a housing recession, spending on housing (services, not to be confused with residential investment) goes up. I'm not surprised that housing operation is going up (electricity is increasing at a 15% rate), but I'm a little baffled why in the middle of dramatic decreases in home prices and sales that spending on housing would be increasing. Medical care and household operation (electricity mostly) make up a big percentage of the increase in services (and therefore services), roughly half. And another large increase is due to other. The big question I have is, why isn't spending on housing services decreasing in the GDP numbers rather than consistently increasing? The durable goods section showed only a small decrease, but the average increase since 2006 in the housing services number has been .6% and increased by .55% this time. Effectively in line. Granted that the ISM non-manufacturing index was below 50 the entire quarter, it makes even less sense why services would be increasing.
Ultimately, if you use better inflation numbers or per-capita figures, this would probably be the second quarter of a declining GDP. Not the best definition of whether we are in a recession, but it's what the financial press usually talks up.
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